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Abstract— We present a set of five axioms for fairness measures
in resource allocation. A family of fairness measures satisfying
the axioms is constructed. Well-known notions such as α-fairness,
Jain’s index, and entropy are shown to be special cases. Properties
of fairness measures satisfying the axioms are proven, including
Schur-concavity. Among the engineering implications is a gen-
eralized Jain’s index that tunes the resolution of the fairness
measure, a new understanding of α-fair utility functions, and an
interpretation of “larger α is more fair”. We also construct an
alternative set of four axioms to capture efficiency objectives and
feasibility constraints.
I. QUANTIFYING FAIRNESS
Given a vector x ∈ Rn+, where xi is the resource allocated
to user i, how fair is it?
One approach to quantify the degree of fairness associated
with x is through a fairness measure, which is a function f
that maps x into a real number. Various fairness measures have
been proposed throughout the years, e.g., in [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6]. These range from simple ones, e.g., the ratio between
the smallest and the largest entries of x, to more sophisticated
functions, e.g., Jain’s index and the entropy function. Some of
these fairness measures map x to normalized ranges between
0 and 1, where 0 denotes the minimum fairness, 1 denotes the
maximum fairness, often corresponding to an x where all xi
are the same, and a larger value indicate more fairness. For
example, min-max ratio [1] is given by the maximum ratio
of any two user’s resource allocation, while Jain’s index [3]
computes a normalized square mean. How are these fairness
measure are related? Is one measures “better” than any other?
What other measures of fairness may be useful?
An alternative approach that has gained attention in the
networking research community since [7], [8] is the approach
of α-fairness and the associated utility maximization. Given
a set of feasible allocations, a maximizer of the α-fair utility
function satisfies the definition of α-fairness. Two well-known
examples are as follows: a maximizer of the log utility function
(α = 1) is proportionally fair, and a maximizer of the α-fair
utility function with α → ∞ is max-min fair. More recently,
α-fair utility functions have also been connected to divergence
measures [9], and in [10], [11], the parameter α was viewed
as a fairness measure in the sense that a fairer allocation is
one that is the maximizer of an α-fair utility function with
larger α — although the exact role of α in trading-off fairness
and throughput can sometimes be surprising [12]. While it is
often held that α → ∞ is more fair than α = 1, which is in
turn more fair than α = 0, it remains unclear what it means
to say that α = 3 is more fair than α = 2.
Clearly, these two approaches for quantifying fairness are
different. On the one hand, α-fair utility functions are con-
tinuous and strictly increasing in each entry of x, thus its
maximization results in Pareto optimal resource allocations.
On the other hand, scale-invariant fairness measures (ones that
map x to the same value as a normalized x) are unaffected
by the magnitude of x, and an allocation that does not use
all the resources can be as fair as one that does. Can the two
approaches be unified?
To address the above questions, we develop an axiomatic
approach to measure fairness. We discover that a set of five
axioms, each of which simple and intuitive, can lead to a useful
family of fairness measures. The axioms are: the Axiom of
Continuity, of Homogeneity, of Asymptotic Saturation, of Ir-
relevance of Partition, and of Monotonicity. Starting with these
five axioms, we can generate a family of fairness measures
from a generator function g: any increasing and continuous
function that leads to a well-defined “mean” function, i.e.,
any Kolmogorov-Nagumo function [16]. For example, using
power functions with exponent β as the generator function, we
derive a unique family of fairness measures fβ that includes
all of the following as special cases, depending on the choice
of β: Jain’s index, maximum or minimum ratio, entropy, and
α-fair utility, and reveals new fairness measures corresponding
to other ranges of β.
In particular, for β ≤ 1, well-known fairness measures (e.g.,
Jain’s index and entropy) are special cases of our construction,
and we generalize Jain’s index to provide a flexible tradeoff
between “resolution” and “strictness” of the fairness measure.
For β ≥ 0, α-fair utility functions can be factorized as the
product of two components: our fairness measure with β = α
and a function of the total throughput that captures the scale,
or efficiency, of x. Such a factorization also quantifies a
tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in achieving Pareto
dominance with the maximum possible α, and facilitates a
clearer understanding of what it means to say that a larger α
is “more fair” for general α ∈ [0,∞).
The axiomatic construction of fairness measures also illu-
minates their engineering implications. Any fairness measure
satisfying the five axioms can be proven to have many useful
properties, including Schur-concavity [14]. Consequently, any
operation balancing resources between two user always results
in a higher fairness value, extending previous results using
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majorization to characterize fairness [4], [13].
The development of an axiomatic theory of fairness takes
another turn towards the end of the paper. By removing the
Axiom of Homogeneity, we propose an alternative set of
four axioms, which allows efficiency of resource allocation
be jointly captured in the fairness measure. We show how
this alternative system connects with constrained optimization
based resource allocation, where magnitude matters due to
the feasibility constraint and an objective function that favors
efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The five
axioms for fairness measures are introduced and discussed in
Section II. Schur-concavity and other properties are proven for
any fairness measure satisfying the five axioms in Section III.
We construct a unique family of fairness measures in Sec-
tion IV and discuss its relation to previous work. Generalized
Jain’s index is revealed from this family of fairness measures
in Section V. Section VI provides a new understanding of
α-fairness by establishing a connection of our fairness measure
to the α-fair utility functions. In Section VII we propose a
second set of axioms that directly incorporates a notion of
efficiency. Concluding remarks are made in Section VIII. Due
to space limitations all proofs can be found in the online full
version [21], together with a discussion contrasting this paper
with the well-known axiomatic theories of Nash bargaining
solution and Shapley value in economics. Main notation is
shown in Table I.
Variable Meaning
x Resource allocation vector of length n
x↑ Sorted vector with smallest element being first
w(x) Sum of all elements of x
f(·), fβ(·) Fairness measure (of parameter β)
g(·) Generator function
si Positive weights for weighted mean
1n Vector of all ones of length n
x  y Vector x majorizes vector y
β Parameter for power function g(y) = yβ
Uα(·) α-fair utility with parameter α
H(·) Shannon entropy function
J(·) Jain’s index
Φλ(·) Our utility for fairness and efficiency
TABLE I
TABLE OF MAIN NOTATION.
II. AXIOMS
Let x be a resource allocation vector with n non-negative
elements. A fairness measure f(x) is a mapping from x to
a real number, i.e., f : Rn+ → R, for all integer n ≥ 1. We
first introduce the following set of axioms about f , whose
explanations and implications are given next.
1) Axiom of Continuity. Fairness measure f(x) is continu-
ous on Rn+ for all integer n ≥ 1.
2) Axiom of Homogeneity. Fairness measure f(x) is a
homogeneous function of degree 0:
f(x) = f(t · x), ∀ t > 0. (1)
Without loss of generality, for a single user, we take
|f(x1)| = 1 for all x1 > 0, i.e., fairness is a constant
for n = 1.
3) Axiom of Asymptotic Saturation. Fairness measure f(x)
of equal resource allocations eventually becomes inde-
pendent of the number of users:
lim
n→∞
f(1n+1)
f(1n)
= 1. (2)
4) Axiom of Irrelevance of Partition. If we partition the
elements of x into two parts x =
[
x1,x2
]
, the fairness
index f(x1,x2) can be computed recursively (with
respect to a generator function g(y)) and is independent
of the partition, i.e.,
f(x1,x2) = f
(
w(x1), w(x2)
)·g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(xi)
))
,
(3)
where w(x1) and w(x2) denote the sum of resource
vectors x1 and x2 respectively, and g(y) is a continuous
and strictly monotonic function that can generate the
following function h:
h = g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(xi)
))
, (4)
with positive weights satisfying
∑
i si = 1 such that h
qualifies as a mean function [15] of {f(xi), ∀i}.
5) Axiom of Monotonicity. For n = 2 users, fairness
measure f(θ, 1 − θ) is monotonically increasing as
the absolute difference between the two elements (i.e.
|1− 2θ|) shrinks to zero.
Axioms 1–2 are very intuitive. The Axiom of Continuity
says that a slight change in resource allocation shows up
as a slight change in the fairness measure. The Axiom of
Homogeneity says that the fairness measure is independent of
the unit of measurement or absolute magnitude of the resource
allocation.
Due to the Axiom of of Homogeneity, for an optimization
formulation of resource allocation, the fairness measure f(x)
alone cannot be used as the objective function if efficiency
(which depends on magnitude ∑i xi) is to be captured. In
Section VI, we will connect this fairness measure with an
efficiency measure in α-fair utility function. In Section VII,
we will remove the Axiom of of Homogeneity and propose an
alternative set of axioms, which make measure f(x) dependent
on both magnitude and distribution of x, thus capturing
fairness and efficiency at the same time.
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Axiom 3 is a technical condition used to ensure unique-
ness of the fairness measure and invariance under change of
variable by fixing a scaling. For example, suppose f(x) is a
fairness measure satisfying all axioms (with respect to a mean
function g(y)) except Axiom 3. It is easy to see that by making
a logarithmic change of variables, fairness measure log f(x)
also satisfies all axioms, respect to a mean function eg(y), other
than Axiom 3.
Initial:
nX
i=1
xi
ւ ց
Level 1:
kX
i=1
xi
nX
i=k+1
xi
ւ ց ւ ց
Level 2: x1, . . . , xk xk+1, . . . , xn
TABLE II
ILLUSTRATION OF THE HIERARCHICAL COMPUTATION OF FAIRNESS.
So far, none of Axioms 1–3 concerns the construction of
fairness measure as the number of users varies. A hierarchical
construction of fairness is used in Axiom 4, which allows us
to derive fairness measure f : Rn+ → R of n users recursively
from lower dimensions, f : Rk+ → R and f : Rn−k+ → R for
integer 0 < k < n. The recursive computation is illustrated by
a two-level representation in Table II. Let x1 = [x1, . . . , xk]
and x2 = [xk+1, . . . , xn]. The computation is performed as
follows. At level 1, since the total resource is divided into two
chunks, w(x1) and w(x1), fairness across the chunks obtained
in this level is measured by f
(
w(x1), w(x2)
)
. At level 2,
the two chunks of resources are further allocated to k and
n−k users, achieving fairness f(x1) and f(x2), respectively.
To compute overall fairness of the resource allocation x =
[x1, x2, . . . , xn], we combine the fairness obtained in the two
levels using a multiplication in equation (3).
As we consider a continuous and strictly increasing gen-
erator function g(y), the function (4) is a mean value [15]
for {f(xi), ∀i}, which represents the average fairness of
individual parts of x. The set of generator functions giving rise
to the same fairness measures may not unique, e.g., logarithm
and power functions. The simplest case is when g is identity
and si = 1/n for all i. A natural choice of the weight si in
(3) is to choose the value proportional to the sum resource
of vector xi. More generally, we will consider the following
weights
si =
wρ(xi)∑
j w
ρ(xj)
, ∀i (5)
where ρ ≥ 0 is an arbitrary exponent. When ρ = 0, weights
in (5) are equal and lead to an un-weighted mean in Axiom 4.
As shown in Section 4, the parameter ρ can be chosen such
that the hierarchical computation is independent of partition
as stated in Axiom 4. As a special case of Axiom 4, if
we denote the resource allocation at level 1 by a vector
z = [w(x1), w(x2)] and if the resource allocation at level
2 are equal x1 = x2 = y, it is straight forward to verify that
Axiom 4 implies
f(y ⊗ z) = f(y) · f(z), (6)
where ⊗ is the direct product of two vectors. As we will
show in Section VII, an extension of equation (6) gives an
alternative way of stating Axiom 4 and leads to a set of more
general axioms on fairness.
Axiom 5 is the only axiom that actually involves a value
statement on fairness: when there are just two users, more
equalized is more fair. This axiom specifies an increasing
direction of fairness and ensures uniqueness of f(x). Consider
the allocation of a unit resource to two users as x = [θ, 1−θ].
It is intuitive that fairness strictly improves as θ → 12 , since the
difference between the two resource shares tends to be smaller.
This intuition also holds for all existing fairness measures, e.g.,
various, spread, deviation, max-min ratio, Jain’s index, α-fair
utility, and entropy.
By definition, axioms are true, as long as they are consistent
and non-redundant. However, not all sets of axioms are useful:
unifying known notions, discovering new measures and prop-
erties, and providing important insights. We start showing the
use of the above five axioms with the following existence (the
axioms are consistent) and uniqueness results. All proofs can
be found at [21].
Theorem 1: (Existence.) There exists a fairness measure
f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5. Furthermore, the fairness
achieved by equal-resource allocations 1n is independent of
the choice of g(y), i.e.,
f(1n) = n
r · f(1), (7)
where r is a constant exponent.
Theorem 2: (Uniqueness.) Given a generator function g, the
resulting f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5 is unique.
III. PROPERTIES OF FAIRNESS MEASURES
We first prove an intuitive corollary from the five axioms
that will be useful for the rest of the presentation.
Corollary 1: (Symmetry.) A fairness measure satisfying Ax-
ioms 1–5 is symmetric over x:
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = f(xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xin), (8)
where i1, . . . , in is an arbitrary permutation of indices
1, . . . , n.
The symmetry property shows that the fairness measure
f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5 is irrelevant of labeling of users.
We now make a direct connection of our axiomatic theory
to a line of work on measuring statistical dispersion by
vector majorization, including the popular Gini Coefficient
[20]. Majorization [14] is a partial order over vectors to study
whether the elements of vector x are less spread out than the
elements of vector y. We say that x is majorized by y, and
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we write x  y, if ∑ni=1 xi =∑ni=1 yi (always satisfied due
to Axiom 2) and
d∑
i=1
x↑i ≤
d∑
i=1
y↑i , for d = 1, . . . , n, (9)
where x↑i and y
↑
i are the ith elements of x↑ and y↑, sorted
in ascending order. According to this definition, among the
vectors with the same sum of elements, one with the equal
elements is the most majorizing vector.
Intuitively, x  y can be interpreted as y being a fairer
allocation than x. It is a classical result [14] that x is majorized
by y, if and only if, from x we can produce y by a finite
sequence of Robin Hood operations.1
Majorization alone cannot be used to define a fairness
measure since it is a partial order and fails to compare vectors
in certain cases. Still, if resource allocation x is majorized
by y, it is desirable to have a fairness measure f such that
f(x) ≤ f(y). A function satisfying this property is known
as Schur-concave. In statistics and economics, many measures
of statistical dispersion are derived as certain extensions of
majorization to the space of non-negative vectors, e.g. Gini Co-
efficient and Robin Hood Ratio [20]. We show that our fairness
measure is Schur-concave, and therefore can be viewed as a
different extension of majorization. Similar to Gini Coefficient
and Robin Hood Ratio, the partial order of majorization is
preserved by our fairness measure.
Theorem 3: (Schur-concavity.) A fairness measure satisfy-
ing Axioms 1–5 is Schur-concave:
f(x) ≤ f(y), if x  y. (10)
Next we present several properties of fairness measures
satisfying the axioms, whose proofs rely on Schur-concavity.
Corollary 2: (Equal-resource allocation is fairest.) A fair-
ness measure f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5 is maximized by
equal-resource allocations, i.e.,
f(1n) = max
x∈Rn
f(x). (11)
Corollary 3: (Collecting a fixed-tax is unfair.) If a fixed
amount c > 0 of the resource is subtracted from each user
(i.e. xi − c for all i), the resulting fairness measure decreases
f(x− c · 1n) ≤ f(x), ∀c > 0, (12)
where c > 0 must be small enough such that all elements of
x− c · 1n are positive.
Corollary 4: (Inactive user achieves no fairness.) When a
fairness measure f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5 is generated by
by ρ > 0 in 5, Removing users with zero resources does not
change fairness:
f(x,0n) = f(x), ∀n ≥ 1. (13)
1In a Robin Hood operation, we replace two elements xi and xj < xi
with xi − ǫ and xj + ǫ, respectively, for some ǫ ∈ (0, xi − xj). In other
words, we take from the rich (xi), and give to the poor (xj ).
IV. A FAMILY OF FAIRNESS MEASURES
A. Constructing Fairness Measures
For any function g(y) satisfying the condition in Axiom 4,
we can generate from g(y) a unique f(x). Such an f(x) is a
well-defined fairness measure if it also satisfies Axioms 1–5.
We then refer to the corresponding g(y) as a generator of the
fairness measure.
Definition 1: Function g(y) is a generator if there exists a
f(x) satisfying Axioms 1–5 with respect to g(y).
We note, however, that different generator functions may
generate the same fairness measure. Although it is difficult
to find the entire set of generators g(y), we have found that
many forms of g(y) functions (e.g., logarithm, polynomial,
exponential, and their combinations) result in fairness mea-
sures equivalent to those generated by the family of power
functions. It remains to be determined if all fairness measures
satisfying Axioms 1–5 can be generated by power functions.
In this section, we consider power functions, g(y) = |y|β ,
parameterized by β and derive the resulting family of fairness
measures, which indeed satisfy all the axioms. The absolute
value ensures that g(y) is non-increasing over R+ for β ≥ 0,
and over R− for β < 0. From here on, we replace Equation
(3) in Axiom 4 by
f(x1,x2) = f
(
w(x1), w(x2)
) ·
(
2∑
i=1
si · fβ(xi)
) 1
β
,
where the weights si are given by (5).
Theorem 4: (Fairness measures generated by power func-
tions) For power mean (g(y) = |y|β with parameter β),
Axioms 1–5 define a unique family of fairness measures as
follows
f(x) =

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−βr
1
β
, for βr ≤ 1 (14)
f(x) = −

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−βr
1
β
, for βr ≥ 1, (15)
where r = 1−ρ
β
is a constant exponent, which determines
the growth rate of maximum fairness as population size n
increases, i.e.
f(1n) = n
r · f(1). (16)
For different parameter β, the fairness measures derived
above are equivalent up to a constant exponent r:
fβ,r(x) = [fβr,1]
r (x), (17)
if we denote fβ,r as the fairness measure with parameters β
and r. According to Theorem 1, r determines the growth rate
of maximum fairness as population size n increases. Without
loss of generality, we choose r = 1 such that the maximum
average fairness per user is a constant f(1n)
n
= f(1). From
a user’s perspective, her perception of maximum fairness is
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independent of the population size of the system. From now
on, we will use a unified representation of the constructed
fairness measurers:
fβ(x) = sign(1− β) ·

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β
1
β
, (18)
where sign(·) is the sign function.
The special cases are summarized in Table III, where β
sweeps from −∞ to ∞ and H(·) denotes the entropy function.
For some values of β, the corresponding mean function h
has a standard name, and for some, known approaches to
measure fairness are recovered, while for β ∈ (0,−1) and
β ∈ (−1,−∞), new fairness measures are discovered. For
instance, β = −1 corresponds to a harmonic mean function
and results in Jain’s index. β = 0 gives a geometric mean
function and Shannon entropy. The fairness measure of an
arithmetic mean function is discontinuous at β = 1.
To illustrate the fairness measures, we consider an example
with 5 users sharing 100 units of resource, and plot fair-
ness fβ(x) over β for different sample vectors, i.e., x(1) =
[99 1 0 0 0], x(2) = [20 20 20 20 20], x(3) = [60 20 10 5 5],
and x(4) = [35 35 15 11 4], in Figure 1. The fairness measures
are discontinuous at β = 0. For different β, we also observe
that the fairness order is preserved on two sets of sample
vectors:
x(2)  x(3)  x(1) and x(2)  x(4)  x(1)
This is an immediate result from the Schur-concavity proven
in Theorem 1.
Value of β Our Fairness Measure Known Names
β →∞ −maxi
nP
i xi
xi
o
Max ratio
β ∈ (1,∞) −
h
(1− β)Uα=β
“
x
w(x)
”i 1
β
α-fair utility
β = 1 ±n (discontinuous) No name
β ∈ (0, 1)
h
(1 − β)Uα=β
“
x
w(x)
”i 1
β
α-fair utility
β → 0 e
H
“
x
w(x)
”
Entropy
β ∈ (0,−1)
»Pn
i=1
“
xi
w(x)
”1−βr– 1β
No name
β = −1
(
P
i xi)
2
P
i xi
2 = n · J(x) Jain’s index
β ∈ (−1,−∞)
»Pn
i=1
“
xi
w(x)
”1−βr– 1β
No name
β → −∞ mini
nP
i xi
xi
o
Min ratio
TABLE III
PREVIOUS RESULTS ARE RECOVERED AS SPECIAL CASES OF OUR
AXIOMATIC CONSTRUCTION. FOR β ∈ (0,−1) AND β ∈ (−1,−∞), NEW
FAIRNESS MEASURES OF GENERALIZED JAIN’S INDEX ARE REVEALED.
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x
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Fig. 1. Plot of fairness fβ(x) for different values of β and sample vectors.
The fairness order is is preserved on two sets of sample vectors: x(2) 
x(3)  x(1) and x(2)  x(4)  x(1). This verifies the Schur-concavity
proven in Theorem 1.
B. Engineering Implications
The fairness measures fβ in (18) corresponding to the gen-
erator function g(y) = |y|β satisfies a number of properties,
which give interesting engineering implications to our fairness
measure.
Corollary 5: (Number of inactive users.) The fairness mea-
sures in (18) also count the number of inactive users in the
system. When fβ < 0, f(x) → −∞ if any user is assigned
zero resource. When f > 0,
Number of users with zero resource ≤ n− f(x),(19)
Maximum resource to a user ≥
∑
i xi
f(x)
. (20)
Corollary 6: (Threshold level of resource.) If we increase
resource allocation to user i by a small amount ǫ, while not
changing other users’ allocation, the fairness measures in (18)
increases if and only if xi < x¯ =
( P
j xjP
j x
1−β
j
) 1
β
and 0 < ǫ <
x¯− xi.
Corollary 7: (Lower bound under box-constraints.) If a
resource allocation x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] satisfies box-
constraints, i.e., xmin ≤ xi ≤ xmax for all i, the fairness
measures in (18) is lower bounded by a constant that only
depends on β, xmin, xmax:
f(x) ≥ sign(1− β) ·
(
µΓ1−β + 1− µ) 1β
(µΓ + 1− µ) 1β−1
, (21)
where Γ = xmax
xmin
and µ = Γ−Γ
1−β−β(Γ−1)
β(Γ−1)(Γ1−β−1)
. The bound is tight
when a µ fraction of users have xi = xmax and the remaining
1− µ fraction of users have xi = xmin.
These results provide intuition on how the family of fairness
measures may be interpreted and applied. Through Corol-
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lary 5, by specifying a level of fairness, we can limit the
number of starved users in a system. Corollary 6 implies that
x¯ serves as a threshold for identifying “poor” and “rich” users,
since assigning an additional ǫ amount of resource to user i
improves fairness if xi < x¯, and reduces fairness if xi > x¯.
Additionally, this provides intuition into threshold methods for
allocating resources serially.
V. APPLICATION 1: GENERALIZING JAIN’S INDEX
When β = −1 (i.e., harmonic mean is used in Axiom 4), we
get a scalar multiple of the widely used Jain’s index J(x) =
1
n
f(x).
Upon inspection of (18) and the specific cases noted in
Table III, we note that any (−∞, 0) ∪ β ∈ (0, 1) the range
of fairness measure fβ(x) lies between 1 and n. Equivalently,
we can say that the fairness per user resides in the interval[
1
n
, 1
]
. When the limit as β → 0 is considered, the resulting
fairness measure can also be shown to have this property.
Because fβ(x) for β < 1 has this characteristic, we refer
to this subclass of our family of fairness measures as the
generalization of Jain’s index.
Definition 2: Jβ(x) = 1nfβ(x) is a generalized Jain’s index
parameterized by β ≤ 1.
The common properties of our fairness index proven in
Section III and IV carry over to this generalized Jain’s index.
For β = −1, J−1(x) reduces to the original Jain’s index.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1
1.5
2
β=+0.5
f
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1
1.5
2
β=−1.0
f
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1
1.5
2
β=−2.5
f
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1
1.5
2
β=−4.0
f
Fig. 2. Plot of the fairness measure fβ(θ, 1−θ) against θ, for resource allo-
cation x = [θ,1− θ] and different choices of β = {−4.0,−2.5,−1.0, 0.5}.
It can be observed that fβ(θ, 1− θ) is monotonic as β → 1. Further, smaller
values of |1−β| results in a steeper incline over small θ, i.e., the low-fairness
region.
Theorem 5: (Monotonicity with respect to β.) The fairness
measures in (18) is negative and decreasing for β ∈ (1,∞),
and positive and increasing for β ∈ (−∞, 1):
∂fβ(x)
∂β
≤ 0 for β ∈ (1,∞), (22)
∂fβ(x)
∂β
≥ 0 for β ∈ (−∞, 1). (23)
The monotonicity of fairness measures fβ(x) on β ∈
(−∞, 1) gives an engineering interpretation of β. Figure 2
plots fairness fβ(θ, 1−θ) for resource allocation x = [θ, 1−θ]
and different choices of β = {−4.0,−2.5,−1.0, 0.5}. The ver-
tical bars in the figure represent the level sets of function f , for
values fβ(θi, 1−θi) = i10 (fmax − fmin) , i = 1, 2, . . . , 9. For
fixed resource allocations, since f increases as β approaches
1, the level sets of f are pushed toward the region with
small θ (i.e., the low-fairness region), resulting in a steeper
incline in the region. In the extreme case of β = 1, all
level set boundaries align with the y-axis in the plot. The
fairness measure f point-wise converges to step functions
fβ(θ, 1 − θ) = 2. Therefore, parameter β characterizes the
shape of the fairness measures: a smaller value of |1−β| (i.e.,
β closer to 1) causes the level sets to be condensed in the
low-fairness region.
Since the fairness measure must still evaluate to a number
between 1 and n here, the monotonicty and resulting shift in
granularity of the fairness measure associated with varying β
suggests differences in evaluating unfairness. At one extreme,
β → 1 any solution where no user receives an allocation of
zero is fairest. On the other hand, as β → −∞ the relationship
between fβ(x) and θ becomes linear, suggesting a stricter
concept of fairness — for the same allocation, as β → −∞
fairness value drops. Therefore, the parameter β can tune the
generalization of Jain’s index f for different tradeoffs between
the resolution and the strictness of fairness measure.
VI. APPLICATION 2: UNDERSTANDING α-FAIRNESS
Due to Axiom 2, the Axiom of Homogeneity, our fairness
measures only express desirability over the (n−1)-dimension
subspace orthogonal to the 1n vector. Hence, they do not
capture any notion of efficiency of an allocation.
We focus in this section on the widely applied α-fair utility
function:∑
i
Uα(xi), where Uα(x) =
{
x1−α
1−α α ≥ 0, α 6= 1
log(x) α = 1
.
(24)
We first show that the α-fairness network utility function can
be factored into two components: one corresponding to the
family of fairness measures we constructed and one corre-
sponding to efficiency. We then demonstrate that, for a fixed α,
the factorization can be viewed as a single point on the optimal
tradeoff curve between fairness and efficiency. Furthermore,
this particular point is one where maximum emphasis is
placed on fairness while maintaining Pareto optimality of the
allocation. This allows us to quantitatively interpret the belief
of “larger α is more fair” across all α ≥ 0.
A. Factorization of α-fair Utility Function
Re-arranging the terms of the equation in Table III, we have
Uα=β(x) =
1
1− β |fβ(x)|
β
(∑
i
xi
)1−β
= |fβ(x)|β · Uβ
(∑
i
xi
)
, (25)
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where Uβ (
∑
i xi) is the one-dimensional version of the α-fair
utility function with α = β. For β → 1, it is easy to show
that our fairness measure fβ(x), multiplied by a function of
throughput
∑
i xi, equals α-fair utility function with α = 1.
Similarly, for β → ∞, it equals α-fair utility function as
α→∞. Therefore, Equation (25) also holds for proportional
fairness at α = 1 and max-min fairness at α→∞.
Equation (25) demonstrates that the α-fair utility functions
can be factorized as the product of two components: a fairness
measure, |fβ(x)|β , and an efficiency measure, Uβ (
∑
i xi).
The fairness measure |fβ(x)|β only depends on the normalized
distribution, x/(
∑
i xi), of resources (due to Axiom 2), while
the efficiency measure is a function of the sum resource
∑
i xi.
Allocation: x
ւ ց
Factorize: x/
P
i xi
P
i xi
↓ ↓
Measure: fβ
`
x/
P
i xi
´
Uβ
`P
i xi
´
ց ւ
Combine: Uα=β(x)
TABLE IV
ILLUSTRATION OF THE FACTORIZATION OF THE α-FAIR UTILITY
FUNCTIONS INTO A FAIRNESS COMPONENT OF THE NORMALIZED
RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND A EFFICIENCY COMPONENT OF THE SUM
RESOURCE.
The factorization of α-fair utility functions is illustrated in
Table IV and decouples the two components to tackle issues
such as fairness-efficiency tradeoff and feasibility of x under
a given constraint set.For example, it helps to explain the
counter-intuitive throughput behavior in [12]: an allocation
vector that maximizes the α-fair utility with a larger α may not
be less efficient, because the α-fair utility incorporates both
fairness and efficiency at the same time.
B. Pareto Optimality in Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs
Although Corollary 2 states equal allocation is fairest, an
α-fair allocation may not have an equal distribution. This is
because the additional efficiency component in (25) can skew
the optimizer (i.e., the resource allocation resulting from α-fair
utility maximization) away from an equal distribution. For
this to happen there must exist an allocation that is feasible
(within the constraint set of realizable allocations) with a
large enough gain in efficiency over all equal distribution
allocations. Hence, the magnitude of this skewing depends on
the fairness parameter (α = β), the constraint set of x, and
the relative importance of fairness and efficiency.
Guided by the product form of (25), we consider a scalar-
ization of the maximization of the two objectives: fairness and
efficiency:
Φλ(x) = λℓ (fβ (x)) + ℓ
(∑
i
xi
)
, (26)
where β ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is fixed, λ ∈ [0,∞) absorbs the
exponent β in the fairness component of (25) and is a weight
specifying the relative emphasis placed on the fairness, and
ℓ(y) = sign(y) log(|y|). (27)
The use of the log function later recovers the product in the
factorization of (25) from the sum in the scalarized (26).
An allocation vector x is said to be Pareto dominated by y if
xi ≤ yi for all i and xi < yi for at least some i. An allocation
is called Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto dominated by any
other feasible allocation. If the relative emphasis on efficiency
is sufficiently high, Pareto optimality of the solution can be
maintained. To preserve Pareto optimality, we require that if
y Pareto dominates x, then Φλ(y) > Φλ(x).
Theorem 6: Preserving Pareto optimality. The necessary
and sufficient condition on λ such that Φλ(y) > Φλ(x) if
y Pareto dominates x is
λ ≤
∣∣∣∣ β1− β
∣∣∣∣ . (28)
Consider the set of maximizers of (26) for λ in the range
in Theorem 6:
P =
{
x : x = argmax
x∈R
Φλ(x), ∀λ ≤
∣∣∣∣ β1− β
∣∣∣∣
}
. (29)
When weight λ = 0, the corresponding points in P is most
efficient. When weight λ =
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣, it can be shown that the
factorization in (25) is equivalent to (26). Therefore, α-fairness
corresponds to the solution of an optimization that places the
maximum emphasis on the fairness measure parameterized by
β = α while preserving Pareto optimality. Allocations in P
corresponding to other values of λ achieve a tradeoff between
fairness and efficiency, while Pareto optimality is preserved.
x2
x1
A
B
Fair
1
2
4
(a)
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
−101
∑
i xi
f β
(x
)
A
λ =
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣
B
β = 3
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) Feasible region (i.e., the constraint set of the utility maximization
problem) where overemphasis of fairness violates Pareto dominance, and (b)
its fairness-efficiency tradeoff for β = 3. Region A corresponds to Pareto
optimal solutions. Region B is when the condition of Theorem 6 is violated,
and solutions are more fair, but no longer Pareto optimal.
Figure 3(b) illustrates an optimal fairness-efficiency tradeoff
curve
{[
fβ(x),Σixi
]
, ∀x = argmaxx∈R Φλ(x), ∀λ
}
corre-
sponding to the constraint set shown in Figure 3(a). The set of
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optimizers P in (29), which is obtained by maximizing Pareto
optimal utilities (26), is shown by curve A in Figure 3(b).
C. Why Larger α is More Fair
In the previous subsection we demonstrated the factorization
(25) is an extreme point on the tradeoff curve between fairness
and efficiency for fixed β = α. What happens when α becomes
bigger?
We denote by ▽x the gradient operator with respect to the
vector x. For a differentiable function, we use the standard
inner product (〈x,y〉 = ∑i xiyi) between the gradient of
the function and a normalized vector to denote the directional
derivative of the function.
Theorem 7: (Monotonicity of fairness-efficiency reward ra-
tio.) Let allocation x be given. Define η = 1
n
1n − xPxi as
the vector pointing from the allocation to the nearest fairness
maximizing solution. Then the fairness-efficiency reward ratio:〈
▽xUα=β(x), η‖η‖
〉
〈
▽xUα=β(x), 1n‖1n‖
〉 , (30)
is non-decreasing with α, i.e. higher α gives a greater relative
reward for fairer solutions.
The the choice of direction η is a direct result of Axiom 2
and Corollary 2, which together imply that η is the direction
that most increases fairness and is orthogonal to increases in
efficiency.
An increase in either fairness or efficiency is a “desirable”
outcome. The choice of α dictates exactly how desirable
one objective is relative to the other (for a fixed allocation).
Theorem 7 states that, with a larger α, there is a larger
component of the utility function gradient in the direction of
fairer solutions, relative to the component in the direction of
more efficiency. Notice, however, that comparison must be
in terms of the ratio between these two gradient components
rather than the magnitude of the gradient, and both fairness
and efficiency may increase simultaneously.
This result provides a justification for the belief that larger
α is “more fair”, not just for α ∈ {0, 1,∞}, but for any α ∈
[0,∞). Figure 4 depicts how this ratio increases with α = β
for some examples allocations.
VII. ALTERNATIVE AXIOMS
Given a set of useful axioms, it is important to ask if
other useful axiomatic systems are possible. By removing or
modifying some of the five axioms here, for example, Axiom 2
that decouples the concern on efficiency from fairness, what
kind of fairness measures will result? Can an alternative set
of axioms lead to the construction of fairness measures that
do not automatically decouple from the notions of efficiency
and feasibility of resource allocation?
In this section, we propose a set of alternative axioms, which
includes Axioms 1–5 as a special case. Let F : Rn+ → R be
a general fairness measure satisfying four axioms as follows.
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3
5 ]
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1
2 ]
x = [ 49100 ,
51
100 ]
Fig. 4. Monotonic behavior of the ratio (30) as a function of α. Three fixed
allocations are considered, and solutions that are already more fair have a
lower ratio.
1′) Axiom of Continuity. Fairness measure F (x) is contin-
uous on Rn+ for all integer n ≥ 1.
2′) Axiom of Asymptotic Saturation. Fairness measure f(x)
of equal resource allocations eventually becomes inde-
pendent of the number of users:
lim
n→∞
F (1n+1)
F (1n)
= 1. (31)
3′) Axiom of Irrelevance of Splitting. For an allocation
vector x = [x1, x2], we split each element xi into
multiple elements by a direct product xiyi, where yi
is a non-negative vector. If the splitting vectors have
equal weights w(y1) = w(y2), the fairness of the new
allocation vector [x1y1, x2y2] is given by
F (x1y
1, x2y
2) = F (x) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
F (yi)
))
,
(32)
where
∑
i si = 1 are positive weights and g(y) is a
continuous and strictly increasing function.
4′) Axiom of Monotonicity. For n = 2 users, fairness
measure F (x1, x2) increases as ratio x1/x2 goes to 1,
when sum resource x1 + x2 is fixed.
Axioms 1′ and 2′ remain the same as Axioms 1 and 3
before. Axiom 4′ is equivalent to Axiom 5 with the additional
qualification that the sum-resource does not change. This
qualification was previously unnecessary due to Axiom 2 —
f(x) does not vary with the amount of total resources —
however, is now required in the new set of axioms. Axiom 3′
is used to recursively construct fairness measure F (x) from
lower dimensions and is similar to the Axiom 4. The vector
[x1y
1, x2y
2] can be viewed as a generalized direct product of
vector x with two different vectors y1 and y2, which split the
resource of each element of x to multiple users. If y1 = y2,
this splitting reduces to a direct product.
Since the Axiom of Homogeneity is removed, fairness
measure F (x) depends on the absolute magnitude of resource
vector x. Using Axiom 3′, we can prove that F (x) is a
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homogeneous function of real degree. Furthermore, the two
sets of axioms are equivalent, if the order of homogeneity
is zero. This means that the new axiomatic system is more
general than the original one.
Theorem 8: (Existence and Uniqueness.) For each genera-
tor g(y), there exists a unique fairness measure F (x) satisfying
Axioms 1′– 4′. We have,
F (x) = f(x) ·
(∑
i
xi
) 1
λ
(33)
where 1
λ
∈ R is the degree of homogeneity and f(x) is a
fairness measure satisfying Axioms 1–5 with respect to the
same generator g(y).
While it is easy to verify that some properties, like that of
symmetry, in Section III also hold for fairness measure F (x),
some properties of fairness measures satisfying Axioms 1–5
are lost in the generalization. For instance, we can no longer
say that equal allocations are best.
When power generators g(y) = |y|β are considered, from
Axioms 1′– 4′ we can derive fairness measure Fβ,λ(x), which
is parameterized by both λ and β,
Fβ,λ(x) = fβ(x) ·
(∑
i
xi
) 1
λ
. (34)
This unifies our results in Sections IV-VI: Generalized Jain’s
index is a special case of Fβ,λ(x) for 1/λ = 0 and β < 1;
fairness measure fβ(x) is a subclass of Fβ,λ(x) for λ = 0;
and α-utility is obtained for 1/λ = β/(1 − β) and β > 0
by comparing (34) and (26). The degree of homogeneity 1/λ
determines how Fβ,λ(x) scales as throughput increases. The
decomposition of fairness and efficiency in Section VI is now
an immediate consequence from Axioms 1′– 4′.
There is a useful connection with the characterization of
α-fair utility function in the last section. The absolute value
|λ| is equivalent to the parameter used for defining the utility
function (26) in Section VI.B. From Theorem 6, we can
conclude that fairness measure Fβ,λ(x) is Pareto optimal if
and only if
1
|λ| ≥
∣∣∣∣ β1− β
∣∣∣∣ . (35)
For every β, there is a minimum degree of homogeneity such
that Pareto optimality can be achieved. When inequality (35)
is not satisfied, Fβ,λ(x) loses Pareto optimality and produces
less throughput-efficient solutions if it is used as an objective
function in utility optimization. Fairness measures with small
degree of homogeneity 1/λ are more suitable for computing
index values of fairness.
The degree of homogeneity of a fairness measure satisfying
Axioms 1′– 4′ parameterizes a tradeoff between the concept
of fairness and efficiency. Moreover, when power functions
are used as generating functions, the degree of homogeneity
is equivalent to 1
λ
in (26). Therefore, the intuition behind our
result on a maximum |λ| (minimum degree of homogeneity)
to ensure Pareto optimality can be extended to the general
optimization-theoretic approach to fairness, i.e. for a fairness
measure F generated from any g, there is a minimum degree of
homogeneity 1
λ
to produce a Pareto optimal solution. Just like
our first set of axioms generalized Jain’s index and revealed
new fairness measures with desirable properties, the second
set of axioms offers a rich family of objective functions.
To summarize, in removing Axiom 2 and adapting the set
of axioms accordingly, we have shown that Axioms 1′– 4′
include Axioms 1–5 as special cases. The resulting measures
are now affected by notions of both efficiency and fairness,
with the balance between the two governed by the degree of
homogeneity 1
λ
.
VIII. RELATED AXIOMATIC THEORIES
Axiomatic theories often form a stable foundation for wide
applications. Famous examples include that of the first order
logic and that of Nash equilibrium. In network economics, two
prominent axiomatic theories have been used to study network
resource allocation. The Nash bargaining solution [18] —
of which proportional fairness is a generalization and which
models the bartering of persons with an initial allotment of
goods — is based on a system of four axioms. In cooperative
game theory in the Shapley value solution concept [19]. Given
the setup of a coalitional game, four axioms2 uniquely define
the Shapley value as the solution concept.
In both of these constructions, effiency was a fundamental
axiom in defining the solution. In fact, both these approaches
to cooperative allocation hold Pareto optimality as an axiom
and thus are more akin to the optimization theoretic approach
to fairness.
The first family of fairness measures, f , is confined to
homogeneous functions of degree zero, and the resulting
measures are an integral part of the α-fairness utility function.
One might suspect that it is possible to extend our axiomatic
structure to the optimization theoretic fairness approach by re-
laxing the Axiom of Homogeneity to homogeneous functions
of arbitrary degree. This is indeed the case as developed by
the previous section.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An axiomatic approach to the fundamental concept of
fairness illuminates many issues in network resource allocation
research. This paper is far from the end of axiomatic theories
of fairness. One way to re-examine axioms is to refute their
corollaries in the context of network resource allocation.
Perhaps all xi being the same should not be a maximizer of
fairness measure, and a fairness measure need not be Schur-
concave. Instead, making some xi bigger should be called
more fair if the resulting x is bigger in all coordinates, i.e.,
those contributing to the overall efficiency should “fairly”
receive more resources. Perhaps the fairness measure should
be a function dependent on the feasible region of allocations.
2Although usually the axioms are presented as a triple, the Shapley value
is the only efficient solution, and thus efficiency of a coalitional strategy can
be considered an axiom
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These possibilities mean that alternative sets of axioms of
fairness, ones with a value statement different from that in
Axiom 5 or Axiom 4′ in this paper, deserve further exploration.
We have also assumed that resource is infinitesimally di-
visible and has no ’user or time dependency’, that the way
resource allocation is decided (e.g., by a central controller
or autonomously) is irrelevant, and that the actual allocation
can be transparently verified. None of these assumptions is
true. Removing them will further enrich axiomatic theories of
fairness in resource allocation.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
We first show that fairness achieved by equal-resource
allocations 1n is independent of the choice of g(y). Without
loss of generality, we assume that f(1) = 1.
Lemma 1: To satisfy Axioms 1–5, fairness achieved by
equal-resource allocations 1n is given by
f(1n) = n
r · f(1), ∀ n ≥ 1, (36)
where r is a constant exponent.
Proof: Applying Axiom 4 to resource allocation vector
1mn with integers m,n ≥ 1, we have
f(1mn) = f(1m, . . . ,1m︸ ︷︷ ︸
n segments
)
= f(m, . . . ,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
n numbers
) · g−1
(
n∑
i=1
si · g (f(1m))
)
= f(1n) · g−1 (g (f(1m)))
= f(1n) · f(1m) (37)
where the second step follows from the Axiom 2 by letting
t = 1/m and the fact that
∑
i si = 1. Equation (37) shows that
log f(1mn) is an additive number-theoretical function [17],
i.e.,
log f(1mn) = log f(1n) + log f(1m) (38)
Further, from Axiom 3, we derive
lim
n→∞
[log f(1n+1)− log f(1n)] = 0 (39)
Using the result in [17], equation (38) and (39) implies that
log f(1n) must be a logarithmic function. We have
log f(1n) = r logn, (40)
where r is a real constant. This is exactly (36) after taking an
exponential on both sides.
Now, we use (36) to derive an expression for the fairness
measure deductively, starting from n = 2 users. Let x1 and
x2 be two rational numbers, such that x1 = a1b1 and x2 =
a2
b2
for some positive integers a1, b1, a2, b2. Using Axiom 4 and
Lemma 1, we have
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
= f(1a1b2+a2b1)
= f(1a1b2 ,1a2b1)
= f(a1b2, a2b1) · g−1 (s1g (f(1a1b2)) + s2g (f(1a2b1)))
= f(a1b2, a2b1) · g−1 (s1g (ar1br2) + s2g (ar2br1)) (41)
Applying Axiom 2 to (41) with t = b1b2, we have
f(x1, x2) = f
(
a1
b1
,
a2
b2
)
= f(a1b2, a2b1)
=
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
g−1 (s1g (ar1b
r
2) + s2g (a
r
2b
r
1))
(42)
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For a given function g(y), equation (42) defines fairness
measure f(x1, x2) for two users for rational vector [x1, x2].
When vector [x1, x2] is real, by Axiom 1, fairness measure
f(x1, x2) is uniquely determined by a sequence of rational
allocation vectors, whose limit is [x1, x2]. Therefore, equation
(42) uniquely defines fairness measure f(x1, x2) for arbitrary
real numbers x1, x2.
Suppose that we have an expression for the fairness
measure f(x1, . . . , xk) with k ≥ 2 users. To derive
f(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1) for k+1 users, we use Axiom 4 to obtain
the following:
f(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1)
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi, xk+1) · g−1 (s1g (f(x1, . . . , xk)) + s2g (f(xk+1)))
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi, xk+1) · g−1 (s1g (f(x1, . . . , xk)) + s2g (1)) (43)
By induction, equations (42) and (43) together defines fairness
measure for all integer n ≥ 1, when the mean function g(y) is
given. If the resulting fairness measure satisfies Axioms 1–5,
it must be unique according to equations (42) and (43). This
proves the uniqueness in Theorem 2.
To prove the existence in Theorem 1, we show that there
exists a mean function g(y), such that the resulting fairness
index in (42) and (43) satisfies Axioms 1–5. We choose g(y) =
log(y) and proportional weights (i.e. ρ = 1) in (5). From (42),
we derive
f(x1, x2) =
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
g−1 (s1g (ar1b
r
2) + s2g (a
r
2b
r
1))
=
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
(a1b2)rs1(a2b1)rs2
=
(x1 + x2)
r
x
rx1
x1+x2
1 x
rx2
x1+x2
2
. (44)
Let uk =
∑k
i=1 xi be the sum of the first k elements in vector
[x1, . . . , xk, xk+1]. Then, using (43) inductively, we obtain
f(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1)
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi, xk+1) · g−1 (s1g (f(x1, . . . , xk)) + s2g (1))
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi, xk+1) · fs1(x1, . . . , xk)
=
(uk + xk+1)
r
(uk)
ruk
uk+xk+1 x
rxk+1
uk+xk+1
k+1
·

 (uk)r∏k
i=1 x
rxi
uk
i


uk
uk+xk+1
=
(uk + xk+1)
r
x
xk+1
uk+xk+1
k+1 ·
∏k
i=1 x
rxi
uk+xk+1
i
(45)
By rearranging the terms in (45), we obtain a fairness measure
generated by logarithmic function g(y) = log(y) and propor-
tional weights:
f(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1) =
(
k+1∑
i=1
xi
)r
·
k+1∏
i=1
x
−rxi
uk+1
i , (46)
where uk+1 =
∑k+1
i=1 xi is the sum of all elements.
We need to prove that the fairness measure in (46) satisfies
Axioms 1–5. It is easy to see that Axioms 1–3 are satisfied by
the fairness measure in (46). To verify Axiom 4, we consider
partitioning a resource allocation vector x of n users into two
segments: x1 = [x1, . . . , xk] and x1 = [xk+1, . . . , xn] for
arbitrary 0 < k < n. Let un−k = un − uk. From (46), we
conclude that
f(x1, . . . , xn)
=
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)r
·
n∏
i=1
x
−rxi
un
i ,
=
(uk + un−k)
r
u
r
uk
un
k u
r
un−uk
un
n−k
·

 urk∏k
i=1 x
xi
uk
i


uk
un
·

 urn−k∏n
i=k+1 x
xi
un−k
i


un−k
un
= f(uk, un−k) · e
uk
un
log f(x1)+
un−k
un
log f(x2)
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi,
n∑
i=k+1
xi) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(xi)
))
, (47)
where weights s1 = ukun and s2 =
un−k
un
are proportional to
the sum resource in each segment. This shows that the fairness
measure in (46) is irrelevant to partition.
To verify Axiom 5, we consider an allocation vector x =
[θ, 1− θ] and compute its fairness measure as follows
f(θ, 1− θ) = 1
θrθ(1− θ)r(1−θ) . (48)
Taking a logarithm on both sides, we have
log f(θ, 1− θ) = r
[
θ log
1
θ
+ (1− θ) log 1
1− θ
]
. (49)
Since the right hand side of (49) is the entropy function, we
conclude that f(θ, 1− θ) is monotonically increasing for θ ∈
[0, 12 ] and monotonically decreasing for θ ∈ [12 , 1]. Therefore,
the fairness measure in (46) satisfies Axioms 1–5.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
For n = 2 users, symmetry follows directly from equation
(42) in Appendix A, i.e.,
f(x1, x2) = f(x2, x1), ∀x1, x2 ≥ 0. (50)
Assume symmetry holds for n users. Let x =
[x1, . . . , xn, xn+1] be a resource allocation vector and
i1, . . . , in, in+1 be an arbitrary permutation of the indices
1, . . . , n, n + 1. When in+1 > 1, applying Axiom 4, we can
use equation (51) to show that
f(xi1 , . . . , xin , xin+1) = f(x1, . . . , xn, xn+1). (52)
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f(xi1 , . . . , xin , xin+1) = f

 n∑
j=1
xij , xin+1

 · g−1 (s1 · g (f(xi1 , . . . , xin)) + s2g (f(xin+1)))
= f

 n∑
j=1
xij , xin+1

 · g−1 (s1 · g (f(x1, . . . , xin+1−1, xin+1+1, . . . , xn+1))+ s2g (f(xin+1)))
= f(x1, . . . , xin+1−1, xin+1+1, . . . , xn+1, xin+1)
= f

in+1−1∑
j=1
xj ,
n+1∑
j=in+1
xj

 · g−1 (s1 · g (f(x1, . . . , xin+1−1))+ s2g (f(xin+1+1, . . . , xn+1, xin+1)))
= f

in+1−1∑
j=1
xj ,
n+1∑
j=in+1
xj

 · g−1 (s1 · g (f(x1, . . . , xin+1−1))+ s2g (f(xin+1 , xin+1+1, . . . , xn+1)))
= f(x1, . . . , xin+1−1, xin+1 , xin+1+1, . . . , xn+1) (51)
When in+1 = 1, using the same technique, we have
f(xi1 , . . . , xin , xin+1) = f(xi1 , . . . , xin+1 , xin)
= f(x1, . . . , xn, xn+1). (53)
Then symmetry also holds for n+ 1 users.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Because vector x is majorized by vector y, if and only
if, from x we can produce y by a finite sequence of Robin
Hood operations [14], where we replace two elements xi and
xj < xi with xi − ǫ and xj + ǫ, respectively, for some ǫ ∈
(0, xi − xj), it is necessary and sufficient to show that such
an Robin Hood operation always improves a fairness measure
defined by Axioms 1–5.
Toward this end, we consider partitioning a resource allo-
cation vector x of n users into two segments: x1 = [xi, xj ]
and x2 = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn]. Let
y = [y1,x2] where y1 = [xi−ǫ, xj+ǫ] be the vector obtained
from x1 by the Robin Hood operation. Using Axiom 4, we
have
f (x)
f (y)
=
f(x1,x2)
f(y1,x2)
=
f(xi + xj ,
∑
k 6=i,j
xk) · g−1
(
s1g
(
f(x1)
)
+ s2g
(
f(x2)
))
f(xi + xj ,
∑
k 6=i,j
xk) · g−1
(
s1g
(
f(y1)
)
+ s2g
(
f(x2)
))
=
g−1
(
s1g (f(xi, xj)) + s2g
(
f(x2)
))
g−1 (s1g (f(xi − ǫ, xj + ǫ)) + s2g (f(x2)))
≤ 1,
where the last step follows form the monotonicity of g and the
monotonicity of fairness measure with two-users in Axiom 5,
i.e.,
f(xi, xj) ≤ f(xi − ǫ, xj + ǫ). (54)
Therefore, if x is majorized by y, then we have f(x) ≤ f(y).
The fairness measure is Schur-concave.
D. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof for Corollary 2 is straightforward, because among
the vectors with the same sum of elements, one with the equal
elements is the most majorizing vector. Let ∑ni=1 xi = n
(which is always satisfied due to Axiom 2). The sum of the d
smallest elements satisfies
∑d
i=1 x
↑
i = n
∑d
i=1 x
↑
i∑n
i=1 x
↑
i
≤ nd
n
≤ d. (55)
Then, x  1n implies f(x) ≤ f(1n), for any resource
allocation vector x.
E. Proof of Corollary 3
Due to Schur-concavity in Theorem 3, it is sufficient to
prove that collecting fixed-tax leads to a more majorizing
allocation vector. From Axiom 2, we consider a vector y =
t (x− c · 1n), which achieves the same fairness as x− c · 1n,
i.e.,
f(x− c · 1n) = f(t (x− c · 1n)) (56)
where t =
P
i xiP
xi−nc
, such that
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
t(xi − c) =
n∑
i=1
yi. (57)
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Then, for any integer 1 ≤ d ≤ n we have
∑d
i=1 y
↑
i =
d∑
i=1
t(x↑i − c)
=
∑d
i=1 x
↑
i − dc∑n
i=1 xi − nc
n∑
i=1
xi
≤
∑d
i=1 x
↑
i − nc
Pd
i=1 x
↑
iP
n
i=1 xi∑n
i=1 xi − nc
n∑
i=1
xi
=
d∑
i=1
x↑i .
where the third step following from the following inequality∑d
i=1 x
↑
i∑n
i=1 xi
≤ d
n
. (58)
We have x  y, which implies f(x) ≥ f(y) = f(x− c · 1).
F. Proof of Corollary 4
Let x be an arbitrary resource allocation vector and t > 0
be a positive number. From Axiom 1, we have
f(x,0n)
= lim
t→∞
f(x,
1
t
1n)
= lim
t→∞
f(
∑
i
xi,
n
t
) · g−1
(
(
∑
i xi)
ρ
g (f(x))
(
∑
i xi)
ρ
+
(
n
t
)ρ
+
(
n
t
)ρ
g (f(1n))
(
∑
i xi)
ρ +
(
n
t
)ρ
)
= lim
t→∞
f(
∑
i
xi,
n
t
) · g−1 (g (f(xn)))
= f(x),
where the third step follows from Axiom 4.
G. Proof of Theorem 4
Without loss of generality, we assume that f(1) = 1. First,
we plug into equations (42) and (43) power mean g(y) = yβ
with weights generated by arbitrary ρ. Equation (42) gives the
fairness measure for two users:
f(x1, x2) =
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
g−1 (s1g (ar1b
r
2) + s2g (a
r
2b
r
1))
=
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r
(s1(a1b2)βr + s2(a2b1)βr)
1
β
=
(a1b2 + a2b1)
r ((a1b2)
ρ + (a2b1)
ρ)
1
β
((a1b2)ρ+βr + (a2b1)ρ+βr)
1
β
=
(x1 + x2)
r (xρ1 + x
ρ
2)
1
β(
xρ+βr1 + x
ρ+βr
2
) 1
β
. (59)
To derive the fairness measure for three users, we consider two
different partitions of the resource allocation vector [x1, x2, x3]
as [x1, x2], [x3] and [x1], [x2, x3]. Using (43), we obtain two
equivalent form of the fairness measure in (60) and (61).
As in Axiom 4, the fairness measure is irrelevant to parti-
tion. Hence, equations (60) and (61) should be equivalent for
all x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0. Comparing the terms in (60) and (61), we
must have r = 0 or ρ + βr = 1. When r = 0, it is easy to
see that f(x1, x2, x3) = 1 is constant. This case is trivial. We
conclude that the fairness measure must have the following
form
f(x1, x2, x3) =
(∑3
i=1 x
1−βr
i
) 1
β
(∑3
i=1 xi
) 1
β
−r
, (62)
where r = 1−ρ
β
is a proper exponent. Let uk =
∑k
i=1 xi be
the sum of the first k elements in vector [x1, . . . , xk, xk+1].
Then, using (43) inductively, we obtain
f(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1)
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi, xk+1) · g−1 (s1g (f(x1, . . . , xk)) + s2g (1))
=
(
u1−βrk + x
1−βr
k+1
) 1
β
(uk + xk+1)
1
β
−r
·

u
ρ
k
Pk
i=1 x
1−βr
i
u
1−βr
k
+ xρk+1
uρk + x
ρ
k+1


1
β
=
(
u1−βrk + x
1−βr
k+1
) 1
β
(uk + xk+1)
1
β
−r
·
[∑k
i=1 x
1−βr
i + x
1−βr
k+1
u1−βrk + x
1−βr
k+1
] 1
β
=
(∑k+1
i=1 x
1−βr
i
) 1
β
(∑k+1
i=1 xi
) 1
β
−r
, (63)
which is exactly equation (14) in Theorem 4.
We still need to prove that the fairness measure in (63)
satisfies Axioms 1–5. It is easy to see that Axioms 1–3 are
satisfied by the fairness measure in (63). To verify Axiom
4, we consider partitioning a resource allocation vector x
of n users into two segments: x1 = [x1, . . . , xk] and x1 =
[xk+1, . . . , xn] for arbitrary 0 < k < n. Let un−k = un − uk
From (63), we conclude
f(x1, . . . , xn)
=
(∑n
i=1 x
1−βr
i
) 1
β
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
1
β
−r
=
(
u1−βrk + u
1−βr
n−k
) 1
β
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
1
β
−r
·
[∑n
i=1 x
1−βr
i
uρk + u
ρ
n−k
] 1
β
= f(uk, un−k) ·

u
ρ
k
Pk
i=1 x
1−βr
i
u
1−βr
k
+ uρn−k
Pn
i=k+1 x
1−βr
i
u
1−βr
n−k
uρk + u
ρ
n−k


1
β
= f(
k∑
i=1
xi,
n∑
i=k+1
xi) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(xi)
))
, (64)
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f(x1, x2, x3) = f(x1 + x2, x3) · g−1 (s1g (f(x1, x2)) + s2g (1))
=
(x1 + x2 + x3)
r ((x1 + x2)
ρ + xρ3)
1
β(
(x1 + x2)ρ+βr + x
ρ+βr
3
) 1
β
·


(x1+x2)
ρ+βr(xρ1+x
ρ
2)
x
ρ+βr
1 +x
ρ+βr
2
+ xρ3
(x1 + x2)ρ + x
ρ
3


1
β
=
(x1 + x2 + x3)
r(
(x1 + x2)ρ+βr + x
ρ+βr
3
) 1
β
·
[
(x1 + x2)
ρ+βr(xρ1 + x
ρ
2)
xρ+βr1 + x
ρ+βr
2
+ xρ3
] 1
β
(60)
f(x1, x2, x3) = f(x1, x2 + x3) · g−1 (s1g (f(1)) + s2g (x2, x3))
=
(x1 + x2 + x3)
r (xρ1 + (x2 + x3)
ρ)
1
β(
xρ+βr1 + (x2 + x3)
ρ+βr
) 1
β
·


(x2+x3)
ρ+βr(xρ2+x
ρ
3)
x
ρ+βr
2 +x
ρ+βr
3
+ xρ1
(x2 + x3)ρ + x
ρ
1


1
β
=
(x1 + x2 + x3)
r(
xρ+βr1 + (x2 + x3)
ρ+βr
) 1
β
·
[
(x2 + x3)
ρ+βr(xρ2 + x
ρ
3)
xρ+βr2 + x
ρ+βr
3
+ xρ1
] 1
β
(61)
where weights s1 =
u
ρ
k
u
ρ
k
+uρ
n−k
and s2 =
u
ρ
n−k
u
ρ
k
+uρ
n−k
are propor-
tional to some power of the sum resource in each segment.
This proves that the fairness measure in (63) is irrelevant to
partition.
To verify Axiom 5, we consider an allocation vector x =
[θ, 1− θ] and compute its fairness measure as follows
f(θ, 1− θ) = [θ1−βr + (1− θ)1−βr] 1β . (65)
It is easy to verify that when 1−βr > 0, the fairness measure
f(θ, 1 − θ) is increasing for θ ∈ [0, 12 ] and decreasing for
θ ∈ [12 , 1]. Axiom 5 is satisfied given 1− βr > 0.
Putting all conditions in the proof together, we conclude
that, when ρ = 1 − βr > 0, the fairness measure given by
(63) is positive and satisfies Axioms 1–5. Similarly, when ρ =
1 − βr < 0, the fairness measure given by (14) is negative.
The proof for this case is the same and not repeated here.
H. Proof of Corollary 5
When f < 0 is negative, it is easy to show that f(x)→ −∞
if xi → 0. When f > 0, suppose that k users are inactive.
From equation (36) and Corollaries 1 and 3, we have
f(x) ≤ f(1n−k) = n− k. (66)
which gives k ≤ n−f(x). Further, since the number of active
users n−k is upper bounded by f(x), the maximum resource
is lower bounded by
∑
i xi/f(x).
I. Proof of Corollary 6
Let k(x) =
∑n
i=1
(
xiP
j xj
)1−β
be an auxiliary function,
such that
f(x) = sign(1− β) · k 1β (x). (67)
Since f(x) is differentiable, we have
∂f(x)
∂xi
=
1
β
k
1
β
−1(x) · |1− β|
(
∑
j xj)
1−β
[
x−βi −
∑
j x
1−β
j∑
j xj
]
Because k(x) > 0 is positive, ∂f(x)
∂xi
has a single root at
xi = x¯ =
( ∑
j xj∑
j x
1−β
j
) 1
β
. (68)
It is straightforward to show that for any β 6= 1, we have
∂f(x)
∂xi
> 0, if xi > x¯ and
∂f(x)
∂xi
< 0, if xi < x¯
Therefore, when xj ∀j 6= i are fixed, f(x) is maximized by
xi = x¯.
J. Proof of Corollary 7
To derive an lower bound on f(x) under the box constraints
xmin ≤ xi ≤ xmax ∀i, we first argue that f(x) is minimized
only if users are assigned resource xmin or xmax. Using the
box constraints and Corollary 6, we have
x¯ =
( ∑
j xj∑
j x
1−β
j
) 1
β
=
(∑
i
xi∑
j xj
· x−βi
)− 1
β
≥
(∑
i
xi∑
j xj
· x−βmin
)− 1
β
= xmin. (69)
Similarly, we can show
x¯ ≤ xmax. (70)
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According to Axiom 4, f(x) is increasing on xi ∈ [xmin, x¯]
and decreasing on xi ∈ [x¯, xmax]. Hence, f(x) is minimized
only if all xi take the boundary values in the box constraints,
i.e.,
xi = xmin or xi = xmax. (71)
Let Γ = xmax
xmin
and µ be fraction of users who receive xmax.
By relaxing the constraint µ ∈ { i
n
, ∀i} to µ ∈ [0, 1], we derive
an lower bound on f(x) as follows
min
xi∈[xmin,xmax],∀i
f(x)
= min
µ∈{ in ,∀i}
sign(1− β) · n
[
µΓ1−β + (1− µ)
(µΓ + 1− µ)1−β
] 1
β
≥ min
µ∈[0,1]
sign(1− β) · n
[
µΓ1−β + (1− µ)
(µΓ + 1− µ)1−β
] 1
β
. (72)
To find the minimizer in the last optimization problem above,
we first recognize that at the two boundary points µ = 0
and µ = 1 (i.e. all users receive the same amount of
resource), f(x) = n achieves its maximum value. Therefore,
the minimum value is achieved by some µ ∈ (0, 1). If µ∗
is the minimizer of (72), it is necessary that the first order
derivative of the right hand side of (72) is zero, i.e.,
∂
[
µΓ1−β+(1−µ)
(µΓ+1−µ)1−β
]
∂µ
= 0. (73)
Soling the above equation, we obtain
(Γ− 1)(1− β) [(Γ1−β − 1)µ+ 1] = (Γ1−β − 1) [(Γ− 1)µ+ 1] .
Because this equation is a linear in µ, its root µ∗ is the unique
minimizer of (72):
µ∗ =
Γ− Γ1−β − β(Γ− 1)
β(Γ− 1)(Γ1−β − 1) . (74)
The lower bound in Corollary 7 follows by plugging µ∗ into
(72).
K. Proof of Theorem 5
We first prove the monotonicity of fβ(x) for β ∈ (−∞, 0).
Consider two different values 0 > β1 ≥ β2. We define the
a function φ(y) = y
β2
β1 for y ∈ R+. Since β2/β1 ≥ 1, the
function φ(y) is convex in y. Therefore, we have
fβ2(x) =

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β2
1
β2
=

 n∑
i=1
xi∑
j xj
· φ

( xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
≤

φ

∑
i=1n
xi∑
j xj
(
xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
=

φ

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β1


1
β2
=

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β1
1
β1
= fβ2(x), (75)
where the third step follows from Jensen’s inequality and β2 <
0. This shows that fβ(x) is increasing on (−∞, 0).
For β ∈ (0, 1), we consider 1 > β1 ≥ β2 > 0. The function
φ(y) = y
β2
β1 becomes concave. We have
fβ2(x) =

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β2
1
β2
=

 n∑
i=1
xi∑
j xj
· φ

( xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
≤

φ

∑
i=1n
xi∑
j xj
(
xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
= fβ2(x). (76)
where the third step follows from Jensen’s inequality and β2 >
0. Therefore, fβ(x) is increasing on (0, 1).
For β ∈ (1,∞), we consider β1 ≥ β2 > 1. The function
φ(y) = y
β2
β1 is concave. We have
fβ2(x) −

 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β2
1
β2
= −

 n∑
i=1
xi∑
j xj
· φ

( xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
≥ −

φ

∑
i=1n
xi∑
j xj
(
xi∑
j xj
)−β1


1
β2
= fβ2(x). (77)
where the third step follows from Jensen’s inequality and β2 >
0. Therefore, fβ(x) is decreasing on (1,∞). This completes
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the proof of Theorem 5.
L. Proof of Theorem 6
We first assume β > 1 (which implies fβ(·) < 0) and show
that the condition λ ≤
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣ is necessary and sufficient for
preserving Pareto optimality. The case where β < 1 can be
shown using a completely analogous proof.
To show that the condition λ ≤
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣ is sufficient, we
consider an allocation x and a vector γ such that γi ≥ 0 for all
i and
∑
i γi =
∑
i xi. Clearly, x′ = x+ δγ Pareto dominates
x for δ > 0. We now consider the difference between the
function (26) evaluated for these two allocations. First assume
β > 1, which implies fβ(·) < 0, and
Φλ(x
′)− Φλ(x)
= λ (ℓ (fβ (x
′))− ℓ (fβ (x))) + ℓ
(∑
i
x′i
)
− ℓ
(∑
i
xi
)
= − λ (log |fβ (x′)| − log |fβ (x)|) + log
(
(1 + δ)
∑
i
xi
)
− log
(∑
i
xi
)
= − λ (log |fβ (x′)| − log |fβ (x)|) + log (1 + δ) . (78)
If x′ is also more fair than x, then showing
−λ (log |fβ (x′)| − log |fβ (x′)|) > 0 (79)
is trivial, and the difference between the objective evaluated at
the two allocations is strictly positive. Therefore, we consider
the case where x′ is less fair.
Continuing from (78) and applying the definition in (18)
yields
Φλ(x
′)− Φλ(x)
= − λ log



 n∑
i=1
(
x′i∑
j x
′
j
)1−β
1
β

+ log (1 + δ)
+ λ log



 n∑
i=1
(
xi∑
j xj
)1−β
1
β


= − λ
β
log
(∑n
i=1 (x
′
i)
1−β∑n
i=1 (xi)
1−β
)
+
(
1− λβ − 1
β
)
log (1 + δ) .
(80)
Because x′i ≥ xi for all i, we know that for β > 1,
(x′i)
1−β ≤ (xi)1−β , which implies
−λ
β
log
(∑n
i=1 (x
′
i)
1−β∑n
i=1 (xi)
1−β
)
> 0. (81)
Consequently, for the entire difference to be positive, it is
sufficient that
1− λβ − 1
β
≥ 0, (82)
or, equivalently,
λ ≤ β
β − 1 . (83)
Next, we prove that the condition λ ≤
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣ is necessary.
Suppose β > 1 and λ >
∣∣∣ β1−β ∣∣∣. We show that there exists two
vectors x and x′, such that Φλ(x′) − Φλ(x) < 0, while x′
Pareto dominates x.
Consider an allocation x of length n+1, such that xi = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n and xn+1 = n. Clearly, x is Pareto dominated
by another vector x′, where x′i = xi for i = 1, . . . , n and
x′n+1 = xi + δ (
∑
i xi), for some positive δ > 0. From the
last step of (80), we have
Φλ(x
′)− Φλ(x)
= − λ
β
log
(∑n+1
i=1 (x
′
i)
1−β∑n+1
i=1 (xi)
1−β
)
+
(
1− λβ − 1
β
)
log (1 + δ)
= − λ
β
log
(
n+ (n+ 2nδ)
1−β
n+ n1−β
)
+
(
1− λβ − 1
β
)
log (1 + δ)
≤ − λ
β
log
(
n
n+ n1−β
)
+
(
1− λβ − 1
β
)
log (1 + δ)
= − λ
β
log
(
1 + n−β
)
+
(
1− λβ − 1
β
)
log (1 + δ)
It is straight forward to verify that Φλ(x′)−Φλ(x) < 0, if we
set
δ =
1
2
[(
1 + n−β
) λ
λ(β−1)−β
]
> 0. (84)
As a result, the condition (28) of the theorem is sufficient
and necessary for ensuring Pareto optimality of the solution.
M. Proof of Theorem 7
From the definition of α-fair utility, we compute the numer-
ator and denominator:〈
▽xUα=β(x), η‖η‖
〉
=
∑
i
x−βi
1
N
− xiP
i xi√
‖x‖2
(
P
i xi)
2 − 1N
=
1√
‖x‖2N
(
P
i xi)
2 − 1
· 1√
N
·
∑
i
x−βi
(
1− xi∑
j xj
N
)
,
(85)
and 〈
▽xUα=β(x), 1‖1‖
〉
=
∑
i
x−βi
1√
N
(86)
=
1√
N
∑
i
x−βi . (87)
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Notice that both values are positive. The ratio between these
then is〈
▽xUα=β(x), η‖η‖
〉
〈
▽xUα=β(x), 1‖1‖
〉 = 1√
‖x‖2N
(
P
i xi)
2 − 1

1−
∑
i
xiP
j xj
x−βi∑
i
1
N
x−βi

 .
(88)
It is easily shown that the factor out fron is strictly positive.
The only component that varies with β is the ratio between two
weighted averages of the same vector with different weights:∑
i
xiP
j xj
x−βi∑
i
1
N
x−βi
. (89)
That average in the numerator places more weight ( xiP
j xj
>
1
N
) on elements that decrease more rapidly (or increase more
slowly for the case xi < 1) with β, implies that the overall
numerator decreases more rapidly (or increases more slowly)
than the denominator. Therefore, (89) is monotonically non-
increasing, and Theorem 7 is true.
N. Proof of Theorem 8
To prove Theorem 8, we need to show that if F (x) satisfies
Axioms 1′-4′, its normalization
f(x) = F (x) ·
(∑
i
xi
)− 1
λ
(90)
is a fairness measure satisfying Axioms 1-5.
The continuity of f(x) follows directly from that of F (x)
in Axioms 1′. Let z > 0 be a positive real number and y be
a vector of arbitrary length. To prove homogeneity, we make
use of Axioms 3′:
F (z · [y,y])
= F (z, z) · g−1 (s1 · g (F (y)) + s2 · g (F (y)))
= F (z, z) · F (y)
= F (1, 1) · g−1 (s1 · g (F (z)) + s2 · g (F (z))) · F (y)
= F (1, 1) · F (y) · F (z)
and similarly,
F (zy, zy)
= F (1, 1) · g−1 (s1 · g (F (zy)) + s2 · g (F (zy)))
= F (1, 1) · F (zy) (91)
Comparing the above two equations, we have
F (zy) = F (z) · F (y). (92)
When y is a scalar, using the result in [17], equation (92)
implies that logF (z) = 1
λ
log(z) must be a logarithmic
function with an exponent 1
λ
. We have
F (zy) = z
1
λF (y), (93)
which is a homogenous function of order 1
λ
. Therefore, its
normalization f(x) in (90) is a homogenous function of order
zero and satisfies Axiom 2.
Using the homogeneity property and Axioms 2′, we obtain
limn→∞
f(1n+1)
f(1n)
= lim
n→∞
F (1n+1)
F (1n)
·
(
1 +
1
n
)− 1
λ
= lim
n→∞
F (1n+1)
F (1n)
= 1. (94)
This is exactly Axiom 3. From Axiom 4′m, Axiom 5 is straight
since
f(θ, 1− θ) = F (θ, 1− θ) · (θ + 1− θ)− 1λ = F (θ, 1− θ).
Therefore, monotonicity holds for f(θ, 1 − θ) for θ ∈ [0, 12 ]
and θ ∈ [0, 12 ], respectively. To prove Axiom 4, we choose
x1 = w(y
1) and x2 = w(y2) in Axiom 3′, which results in
f(y1,y2)
= F (y1,y2) · (w(y1) + w(y2))− 1λ
= F (x1, x2) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
F (yi/xi)
)) · (x1 + x2)− 1λ
= F (x1, x2) · (x1 + x2)−
1
λ · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(yi/xi)
))
= f (x1, x2) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(yi)
))
= f
(
w(y1, w(y2
) · g−1
(
2∑
i=1
si · g
(
f(yi)
)) (95)
where the second last step uses the fact that f is a homogenous
function of order zero. This proves Axiom 4.
If F (x) satisfies Axioms 1′-4′, we have shown that its
normalization f(x) is a fairness measure satisfying Axioms 1-
5. Therefore, F (x) is homogenous function of order 1
λ
and is
given by
F (x) = f(x) ·
(∑
i
xi
) 1
λ
. (96)
Existence and unique of F (x) is straightforward from that of
f(x) in Theorems 1 and 2.
